In retrospect, China did a remarkably effective job managing threat perceptions across the first two decades of its spectacular rise. International relations theory posits that China's rapid ascent to regional hegemony would provoke one of two responses from its neighbors: either to "Bandwagon" with China, effectively submitting to its authority, or to internally and externally "Balance" against its growing power.
Until recently, however, China's key neighbors—including India, Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Myanmar, and South Korea—largely defied this prediction, assiduously avoiding the choice between Balancing and Bandwagoning. Instead, they pursued the mildest variants of both, engaging with (but not submitting to) Beijing while maintaining modest and non-threatening security relationships with the U.S. and other regional powers. This behavior is partly attributable to the nature of Asian diplomacy and the inherent proclivity to seek at least the veneer of harmonious relations with all parties while avoiding "taking sides" or making hard choices wherever possible.
It's little surprise that Bandwagoning with China is a decidedly unpalatable option for most regional capitals, given their bitter historical experiences and the potent forms of nationalism coursing through the region. Yet the absence of more overt Balancing behavior was more perplexing, and a testament to the effectiveness of China's "peaceful rise" narrative and the soft power diplomatic and economic offensive atop which it was built. This narrative benefitted from Chinese leadership that was relatively restrained in both its actions and demeanor, as evidenced in the bookish, almost timid figure cut by Hu Jintao, China's president from 2002-2012.
China was also aided by no shortage of global distractions and tragedies, including: the end of the Cold War, the first Gulf War, the onset of the Information Age and Globalization, the 1998 Asian financial crisis, 9/11 and the rise of Islamist terrorism, the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program, and a steady stream of crises in the Middle East, to name just a few.
In this turbulent geopolitical context, China's rise looked—and often felt—quite peaceful. Beijing treated its neighbors with relative magnanimity as it sought membership, and later leadership, in an alphabet's soup of regional and international institutions. Preoccupied with domestic economic development and social stability, Beijing reached compromises with its neighbors on the majority of its land border disputes through the mid-2000s, often on terms favorable to the opposite party. Meanwhile, by mid-decade Asian views toward the U.S. were souring, particularly after the Bush administration's 2003 invasion of Iraq.
At the end of the last decade something changed, however. Perceptions about China's rise, and China's behavior itself, began to evolve at an accelerating rate. The phenomenon arguably began in 2008, with China's hosting of the Beijing Olympics and the onset of the global financial crisis, which China seemed to weather far better than its peers.
Those dual events prompted something of an awakening of Chinese nationalism, a trend further fueled by the relative opening of China's online news and social media space. A rapid expansion of Internet access and engagement paralleled the rise of a new generation of popular Chinese online and print outlets with a distinctly nationalist bent. While the proliferation of nationalist discourse served the Chinese Communist Party's interests, it also created new pressures and incentives that rewarded hardline posturing and raised the political cost of concessions and compromise.
TOWARD CONFRONTATION
In 2009, China's territorial disputes in the South China Sea, relatively dormant over the preceding two decades, rose to the forefront of regional security concerns. A joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations in May of that year outlining their continental shelf claims[1] was followed a day later by China's first-ever formal submission to an international body of the ambiguously-defined "9-dash line" that encompasses nearly the entire South China Sea.[2] In the years to follow, China's policies and rhetoric toward the South China Sea (and later the East China Sea) hardened.
The rise of President Xi Jinping, first as head of the Communist Party in November 2012 and then as President in March 2013, only crystalized concerns that China had abandoned its "peaceful rise." Xi amassed and consolidated power with greater speed and efficacy than his contemporaries, not least through an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign targeting "tigers and flies," paired with a massive restructuring of the Chinese military and purge of disloyal officers. His avowedly more confident and outwardly nationalist personal disposition was eventually reflected in a more assertive and combative Chinese international posture.
In an early address to the Politburo in July 2013, Xi argued China must focus on "promoting a shift toward overall planning and consideration of both rights protection and stability maintenance." As analyst Ryan Martinson notes: "In this scarcely penetrable prose, Xi is saying that in the past China had attached too much importance to stable relations with its neighbors, to the cost of 'rights protection.' Under Xi's leadership, China would balance these competing objectives in a way that favored rights over stability."[3]
In the years that followed, the region witnessed steady escalation of tensions and clashes at sea amid China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, its declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea in 2013, its positioning of an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam in 2014, and its gradual construction and militarization of seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands beginning in mid-2014. Meanwhile, regional diplomats began to complain about a more belligerent and arrogant tone assumed by Chinese officials in private and public interactions.
Xi's China seemed to be abandoning the guiding adage of Deng Xiaoping, "hide your capabilities, bide your time," in favor of the confident pursuit of the "Chinese Dream." An increasingly popular nationalist discourse portrays China as an aggrieved nation desperately trying to recover from a "Century of Humiliation" suffered at the hands of foreign powers. It argues that China is a nation under constant duress from neighbors seeking to leverage its weakness for territorial gains. And the U.S., while still respected as the global superpower, is increasingly portrayed as wielding an invisible hand directing regional events against China's interests.
Indeed, Chinese scholars and experts now regularly identify the U.S. "Pivot to Asia," announced in early 2011, as the source of recent regional tensions and instability. Meanwhile, Washington is often portrayed as covertly encouraging regional capitals to provoke China in the East and South China Seas, undermine its efforts at regional diplomacy, and establish a coalition of regional powers to "contain" China's rise. A video released in the summer of 2016 by China's Supreme People's Procuratorate warned: "clouds of domestic troubles and foreign dangers...are destroying China's domestic stability and harmony with all possible means. Behind all these incidents we can often see the shadow of the Stars and Stripes."[4]
REGIONAL REACTIONS
Chinese nationalists are right to be concerned the regional tides are turning against them, even if their diagnosis of the problem is grossly misplaced. The reality is, after avoiding the choice between Bandwagoning and Balancing for so many years, many regional capitals have reached a tipping point and are being drawn to the latter. With political freedoms in China receding domestically and foreign policy bravado expanding abroad, its neighbors increasingly see moves toward Balancing as their best means of insurance against Chinese coercion or aggression.
That much is evident in regional attitudes toward Internal Balancing, or enhancing domestic military capabilities. In 2013, for the first time in recent history, more money was spent on defense in Asia than in any other region in the world. In 2015, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam increased defense spending by 16%, 25%, and 7.6%, respectively. Indeed, last year global defense spending grew by just 1%, but in Asia it swelled by 5.4%. And it's now expected to climb a further 23% between 2016 and 2020.[5] The largest importer of arms in the world over the last five years was India.
The signs of External Balancing are no less obvious. A budding network of new defense linkages among select Asian "Middle Powers" is producing a staggering number of "firsts": from new defense dialogues, to new bilateral and multilateral military exercises, Joint Vision Statements, and arms deals. As they have moved to strengthen inter-Asian defense ties, so too have many drawn closer to the U.S., and made no secret of their desire to see a stronger U.S. presence in the region.
To highlight how quickly the landscape is shifting, consider the number of "firsts" to take place in the past two years: the first India-Japan-Australia Trilateral Dialogue; the first case of Japanese troops exercising on Australian soil; the first visit by Vietnam's Communist Party chief to the U.S.; the first India-U.S. Joint Vision for the Indo-Pacific; the first visit by a U.S. defense secretary to a Vietnamese military base; the first joint India-Australia maritime exercises; the first Japan-Philippines naval exercise in the South China Sea; the first Japanese consideration of military exports in decades; the first visit by a U.S. defense secretary to U.S. Pacific Command; the first U.S.-India cooperation on aircraft carriers; and the first-ever purchase of submarines and advanced missiles by the Philippines, to name just a few. The Asia-Pacific, says Asia expert Alexander Sullivan, is "seeing an unprecedented level of regional security cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, which will continue in the coming years."[6]
CAUSE AND EFFECT
By blaming the U.S. and failing to recognize China's culpability in this phenomenon, Chinese nationalists are doing their nation a disservice, and merely accelerating the trend toward Balancing in the process. As U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has noted, it is China's behavior that is "out of step with both the international rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific's security architecture," and it is China's behavior that is "spurring nations to respond together in new ways"[7] and "causing many countries in the region to want to intensify their security cooperation with the United States."[8]
Asian nations are far too proud and far too independent to be cajoled by the United States into working against their self-interest. And America is far too pragmatic and far too invested in U.S.-China ties to covertly seek to create some sort of containment alliance against China. Regional trends toward Balancing are being driven by fear and anxiety over Chinese policies. Chinese nationalists would be better served trying to understand and address the concerns of their neighbors rather than peddling conspiracy theories about Uncle Sam.
Jeff M. Smith is the Director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy
Council.
[1] United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, "Submissions to the Commission: Joint submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam," May 6, 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm.
[2] U.S. Department of State, "Limits in the Seas No. 143 China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea," December 5, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf
[3] Ryan Martinson, "A Salt Water Perspective on China's New Military Strategy," Real Clear Defense, June 2, 2015, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/06/02/a_salt_water_perspective_on_chinas_new_military_strategy_107997.html.
[4] "Video by Supreme People's Procuratorate warns of 'dark shadow of the Stars and Stripes,'" YouTube, August 2, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uBXypPR1yI.
[5] David Tweed, "How Asia's Military Spending Growth is Outpacing the World," Bloomberg, May 31, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/asia-military-spending-rises-in-china-s-shadow-spurring-deals
[6] Alexander Sullivan, "Charting the Contours of Asia's Megatrends," Center for a New American Security Policy Brief, February 2014, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/AsiaPacificMegatrends_policybrief_Sullivan.pdf.
[7] Ashton Carter, "A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises," Remarks before the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-a-regional-security-architecture-where-everyone-rises.
[8] Yeganeh Torbati, "South China Sea disputes increasing demand for U.S. security presence: Pentagon chief," Reuters, November 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-defensechief-idUSKCN0SQ1DY20151101.