The effects of this game of brinksmanship being played by China, and to a lesser degree India, have so far been constrained by prudent and cautious political leaders in both capitals. However, the longer the aura of confrontation perpetuates, the more it generates a momentum of its own. Hawkish comments by officials and newspaper editors are easily dismissed; shifts in military doctrines and public opinion are much harder to reverse.
Nevertheless, it is critically important not to overstate the degree of animosity in Sino-Indian relations. The two countries enjoy booming economic ties, including US$60 billion in annual bilateral trade, projected to surge to US$100 billion by 2015. High-level governmental exchanges are frequent, and the official discourse often diplomatic and complimentary. Many on the Indian left, and within its powerful government bureaucracy, see China more as friend than foe. China, as it does with all its neighbors, frequently stresses the need for peaceful co-existence, mutual respect, and non-interference in each others' affairs. Leaders in both capitals have committed to resolving their border disputes through peaceful means and diplomatic negotiations. However, actions speak louder than words and while the potential for conflict remains low in the short term, many Sino-Indian divisions are widening rather than narrowing.
It is hard not to view the rise in tensions over the past five years as a story of Chinese provocations against India. This perception is buttressed by several factors. One is that China's provocations have been tangible, documentable policies, while Beijing's complaints about India are more abstract. For instance, Beijing clearly harbors animosity toward India for hosting the Dalai Lama, who, it argues rather unconvincingly, is trying to incite unrest in Tibet. For many Chinese, India is a willing accomplice. China also appears uncomfortable with the budding Indo-US alliance, which Beijing sees as part of a larger design by the United States to encircle it with an anti-China coalition. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the spike in Sino-Indian tensions, beginning in 2006, came shortly after the United States and India signed the landmark US-India nuclear deal and entrenched their strategic alliance. Finally, as China works to curry influence in South Asia, India is itself pursuing a "Look East" policy, signing free trade deals and boosting military cooperation with countries in China's "orbit," like Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan and South Korea.
Another explanation is that China has simply been more provocative. Of course, provocative need not be illegitimate. China is within its right to pursue greater influence in South Asia and modernize its military, and India is within its right to be concerned by these moves. But it is hard to view other policies—border incursions, challenges to India's sovereignty over Kashmir, confrontation at international institutions, cyber-attacks—as benign and not specifically designed to provoke India.
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